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Modern society depends on increasingly interdepen-
dent systems that are prone to widespread failure. Trans-
portation, communication, power grids and other infras-
tructures support one another and the world’s inter-
connected economies. Barrages of incidents large and
small—downed power lines, grounded aircrafts, natural
disasters and the like—cause avalanches of repercussions
that cascade within and among these systems [1]. Al-
though interdependence confers benefits, its effect on the
risks of individual systems and on the collection of them
remains poorly understood.
Here we analyze how the interconnectivity (interde-
pendence) between networks affects the sizes of their
cascades of load shedding. For networks derived from
interdependent power grids, we show that interdepen-
dence can have a stable equilibrium. An isolated net-
work suppresses its large cascades by connecting to other
networks, but too many interconnections exacerbate its
largest cascades—and those of the whole system. We de-
velop techniques to estimate this optimal amount of in-
terconnectivity, and we examine how differences among
networks’ capacity and load affect this equilibrium. Our
framework advances the current mathematical tools for
analyzing dynamics on interdependent (or modular) net-
works, and it improves our understanding of systemic risk
in coupled networks.
In the basic process we consider, a system contains
many elements that shed load to neighboring elements
whenever they reach their capacity. This is captured
by the classic sandpile model of Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld,
a paradigm for the power law statistics of cascades in
many disciplines, from neuronal avalanches to financial
instabilities to electrical blackouts [24]. In a basic for-
mulation on a graph of nodes and edges, each node has
a capacity for holding grains of sand (interpreted here
as load or stress). Grains of sand are dropped randomly
on nodes, and whenever a node has more sand than its
capacity, it topples and sheds all its sand to its neigh-
bors, which may in turn have too much sand and topple,
and so on. Thus dropping a grain of sand can cause an
avalanche (cascade) of topplings. These avalanches, like
blackouts in power grids [6], occur in sizes characterized
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by a power law: they are often small but occasionally
enormous.
The Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld model was originally formu-
lated on a lattice. Given the relevance of networked sys-
tems, the dynamics have recently been studied on iso-
lated networks, but not yet on interdependent (or mod-
ular) networks. Here we study it on two networks with
sparse connections between them. Each network models
an infrastructure (or a module of one), and the inter-
connections between them model their interdependence.
We explicitly study networks extracted from two inter-
dependent power grids in the southeastern USA and an
idealization of them that is more amenable to mathemat-
ical study. In this idealization, each node is connected to
a node in the other network with probability p (Fig. 1,
inset).
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FIG. A1: The chance that a network a coupled to another
network b suffers a cascade larger than half its network (gold
curve) has a stable minimum at a critical amount of inter-
connectivity p∗. Networks seeking to mitigate their largest
cascades would prefer to build or demolish interconnections
to operate at this critical point p∗. The blue (red) curve is
the chance that a cascade that begins in a (b) topples at least
1000 nodes in a. Increasing interconnectivity only exacerbates
the cascades inflicted from b to a (red), but interestingly it
initially suppresses the local cascades in a. (From simulations
on coupled random 3-regular graphs; the inset depicts a small
example with 30 nodes per network and p = 0.1.)
Our main result is that interdependence can have a
stable equilibrium (Fig. A1). Some interconnectivity is
beneficial to an individual network, for the other net-
work acts as a reservoir for extra load. The gold curve
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2of Fig. A1 shows that the chance of a large cascade in a
network can be reduced by 70% by increasing the inter-
connectivity p from 0.0005 to 0.075. Too much interde-
pendence, however, becomes detrimental for two reasons.
First, new interconnections open pathways for the neigh-
boring network to inflict additional load. Second, each
interconnection augments the system’s capacity, making
available more load that fuels even larger cascades in each
network. As a result, the chance of a large cascade in an
individual network eventually increases with interconnec-
tivity p, so p∗ is a stable minimum.
This second factor above—that new interconnections
increase the networks’ capacity for load—has global con-
sequences. With more load available, larger cascades in
the system as a whole become possible. Therefore net-
works that interconnect to one another to mitigate their
own cascades (Fig. A1) may unwittingly cause larger
global cascades in the whole system. This is a warn-
ing for the interconnections under construction among,
for example, different power grids to accommodate long-
distance trade and renewable sources of energy [11].
The results in Fig. A1 show that networks suppress-
ing their largest cascades would seek interconnectivity p∗.
However, as shown in the the main article, building inter-
connections to operate at p∗ increases the occurrence of
small cascades. Conversely, networks can suppress their
smallest cascades the most by seeking isolation, p = 0.
But suppressing their smallest cascades exacerbates their
largest ones (left side of Fig. A1), just as extinguishing
small forest fires can incite large ones and engineering
power grids to suppress small blackouts can increase the
risk of large ones [6].
Finally we determine how asymmetry among networks
affects the optimal level of interconnectivity that each
prefers. For instance, two interconnected power grids
may differ in capacity, load, redundancies, demand, sus-
ceptibility to line outages, and ages of infrastructure. We
capture these differences with a parameter that controls
the rates at which cascades begin in either network. We
show that in any asymmetric situation the equilibrium
will be frustrated, with only one of the grids able to
achieve its optimal level of interconnectivity.
Determining how interdependence affects the function-
ing of networks is critical to understanding the infras-
tructure so vital to modern society. Whereas others have
recently shown that interdependence can lead to alarm-
ingly catastrophic cascades of failed connectivity [20],
here we show that interdependence also provides ben-
efits, and these benefits can balance the detriments at
stable equilibria. We expect that this work will stim-
ulate calculations of critical points in interconnectivity
among networks subjected to other dynamics. As crit-
ical infrastructures such as power grids, transportation,
communication, banks and markets become increasingly
interdependent, resolving the risks of large cascades and
the incentives that shape them becomes ever more im-
portant.
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3Suppressing cascades of load in interdependent networks
Understanding how interdependence among systems affects cascading behaviors is increasingly important
across many fields of science and engineering. Inspired by cascades of load shedding in coupled electric
grids and other infrastructure, we study the Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld sandpile model on modular random
graphs and on graphs based on actual, interdependent power grids. Starting from two isolated networks,
adding some connectivity between them is beneficial, for it suppresses the largest cascades in each system.
Too much interconnectivity, however, becomes detrimental for two reasons. First, interconnections open
pathways for neighboring networks to inflict large cascades. Second, as in real infrastructure, new inter-
connections increase capacity and total possible load, which fuels even larger cascades. Using a multitype
branching process and simulations we show these effects and estimate the optimal level of interconnectivity
that balances their tradeoffs. Such equilibria could allow, for example, power grid owners to minimize the
largest cascades in their grid. We also show that asymmetric capacity among interdependent networks
affects the optimal connectivity that each prefers and may lead to an arms race for greater capacity.
Our multitype branching process framework provides building blocks for better prediction of cascading
processes on modular random graphs and on multi-type networks in general.
Networks that constitute our critical infrastructure in-
creasingly depend on one another, which enables cascades
of load, stress and failures [1–6]. The water network, for
instance, turns turbines and cools nuclear reactors in the
electrical grid, which powers the transportation and com-
munications networks that underpin increasingly inter-
dependent global economies. Barrages of disturbances at
different scales—volcanic eruptions [7], satellite malfunc-
tions [4], earthquakes, tsunamis, wars [8]—trigger cas-
cades of load shedding in interdependent transportation,
communication and financial systems. Interdependence
can also increase within a particular infrastructure. The
electrical grid of the United States, for example, consists
of over 3,200 independent grids with distinct ownership—
some private, others public—and unique patterns of con-
nectivity, capacities and redundancies [9]. To accommo-
date rising demand for electricity, long distance trade of
energy [10], and new types of power sources [11], inter-
connections among grids bear ever more load [12], and
many new high-capacity transmission lines are planned
to interconnect grids in the United States and in Eu-
rope [13]. Figure 1 shows the new interconnections
planned to transport wind power [11]. Though neces-
sary, these interconnections affect systemic risk in ways
not well understood, such as in the power grid, where the
modular structure affects its large cascades. For exam-
ple, the August 14, 2003 blackout, the largest in North
American history, spread from a grid in Ohio to one in
Michigan, then to grids in Ontario and New York before
overwhelming the northeast [10, 14].
Researchers have begun to model cascades of load and
failure within individual power grids using probabilistic
models [6], linearized electric power dynamics [16, 17]
and game theory [18]. The first models of interdepen-
dent grids use simplified topologies and global coupling
to find that interconnections affect critical points of cas-
cades [19], which suggests that they may affect the power
law distributions of blackout size [6, 12]. Models with
interconnections among distinct infrastructure have fo-
cused on the spread of topological failures, in which nodes
FIG. 1: The power grid of the continental United States, illus-
trating the three main regions or “interconnects”—Western,
Eastern and Texas—and new lines (in orange) proposed by
American Electric Power to transport wind power. Source:
NPR [11].
are recursively removed [20–22], and not on the dynami-
cal processes occurring on these networks. These models
find that interdependence causes alarmingly catastrophic
cascades of failed connectivity [20–22]. Yet as we show
here, interdependence also provides benefits, and these
benefits can balance the dangers at stable critical points.
Here we develop a simple, dynamical model of load
shedding on sparsely interconnected networks. We study
Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld (BTW) sandpile dynamics [23, 24]
on networks derived from real, interdependent power
grids and on sparsely coupled, random regular graphs
that approximate the real topologies. Sandpile dynam-
ics are paradigms for the cascades of load, self-organized
criticality and power law distributions of event sizes that
pervade disciplines, from neuronal avalanches [25–27] to
cascades among banks [28] to earthquakes [29], landslides
[30], forest fires [31, 32], solar flares [33, 34], and electri-
cal blackouts [6]. Sandpile cascades have been extensively
studied on isolated networks [7–12, 36]. On interdepen-
dent (or modular) networks, more basic dynamical pro-
4cesses have been studied [42–45], but sandpile dynamics
have not.
We use a multitype branching process approximation
and simulations to derive at a heuristic level how interde-
pendence affects cascades of load. Isolated networks can
mitigate their largest cascades by building interconnec-
tions to other networks, as those networks provide reser-
voirs to absorb excess load. Build too many interconnec-
tions, however, and the largest cascades in an individual
network increase in frequency for two reasons: neigh-
boring networks inflict load more easily, and each added
interconnection augments the system’s overall capacity
and load. These stabilizing and destabilizing effects bal-
ance at a critical amount of interconnectivity, which we
analyze for synthetic networks that approximate interde-
pendent power grids. As a result of the additional load in-
troduced by interconnections, the collection of networks,
viewed as one system, suffers larger global cascades—a
warning for the increasing interdependence among elec-
trical grids (Fig. 1), financial sectors and other infras-
tructure [11–13]. Finally we study the effects of capacity
and load imbalance. Networks with larger total capac-
ity inflict larger avalanches on smaller capacity networks,
which suggests an arms race for greater capacity. The
techniques developed here advance the theoretical ma-
chinery for dynamical processes on multi-type networks
as well as our heuristic understanding of how interde-
pendence and incentives affect large cascades of load in
infrastructure.
I. THEORETICAL FORMULATION
A. Sandpile dynamics
Introduced by Bak, Tang and Wiesenfeld in 1987 and
1988 [23, 24], the sandpile model is a well-studied, styl-
ized model of cascades that exhibits self-organized criti-
cality, power laws and universality classes and that has
spawned numerous related models with applications in
many disciplines (e.g., [30, 31, 33, 34, 46]). In a basic
formulation on an arbitrary graph of nodes and edges,
one drops grains of sand (or “load”) uniformly at ran-
dom on the nodes, each of which has an innate threshold
(or capacity). Whenever the load on a node exceeds its
threshold, that node topples, meaning that it sheds (or
moves) its sand to its neighbors. These neighbors may in
turn become unstable and topple, which causes some of
their neighbors to topple, and so on. In this way, drop-
ping a grain of sand on the network can cause a cascade
of load throughout the system—often small but occa-
sionally large. The cascade finishes once no node’s load
exceeds its capacity, whereupon another grain of sand is
dropped, and the process repeats. Probability measures
of the size, area, and duration of avalanches typically
follow power laws asymptotically in the limit of many
avalanches [47].
Many classic versions of the sandpile model [23, 46, 47]
connect the nodes in a finite, two-dimensional lattice and
assign all nodes threshold four, so that a toppled node
sheds one sand grain to each of its four neighbors. The
lattice has open boundaries, so that sand shed off the
boundary is lost, which prevents inundation of sand. A
few variants of the model on lattices can be solved exactly
if the shedding rules have abelian symmetry [47].
More recently, sandpile models have been studied on
isolated networks, including Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [10, 36],
scale-free graphs [7–9], and graphs generated by the
Watts-Strogatz model on one-dimensional [11] and on
two-dimensional [12] lattices. A natural choice for the
capacities of nodes—which we use here—is their degree,
so that toppled nodes shed one grain to each neighbor
[7, 48]. Other choices include identical [7], uniformly dis-
tributed from zero to the degree k [8], and k1−η for some
0 ≤ η < 1 [8, 9], but all such variants must choose ways to
randomly shed to a fraction of neighbors. Shedding one
grain to each neighbor is simpler and exhibits the rich-
est behavior [7]. A natural analog of open boundaries on
finite lattices is to delete grains of sand independently
with a small probability f as they are shed. We choose
the dissipation rate of sand f so that the largest cascades
topple almost the entire network.
The mean-field solution of sandpile cascades is charac-
terized by an avalanche size distribution that asymptot-
ically obeys a power law with exponent -3/2 and is quite
robust to network structure. (For example, on scale-free
random graphs, sandpile cascades deviate from mean-
field behavior only if the degree distribution has a suffi-
ciently heavy tail, with power law exponent 2 < γ < 3
[7].) Nevertheless, sparse connections among interdepen-
dent networks divert and direct sandpile cascades in in-
teresting, relevant ways.
B. Topologies of interacting networks
Here we focus on interdependent power grids and ide-
alized models of them. We obtained topological data on
two interdependent power grids—which we label c and
d—from the US Federal Energy Regulation Commission
(FERC) [49]. (All data shown here is sanitized to omit
sensitive information.) Owned by different utilities but
connected to one another in the southeastern USA,[68]
power grids c and d have similar size (439 and 504 buses)
but rather different average internal degrees (2.40 and
2.91, respectively). The grids are sparsely interconnected
by just eight edges, making the average external node
degrees 0.021 and 0.018, respectively. More information
on c, d is in Table S1 of the SI. As in other studies, we
find that these grids have narrow degree distributions
[3, 50, 51] and are sparsely interconnected to one an-
other [12].
To construct idealized versions of the real grids, con-
sider two networks labeled a and b. Due to the narrow
degree distribution of the real grids, we let network a be
a random za-regular graph (where each node has degree
5za) and network b be a random zb-regular graph. These
two are then sparsely interconnected as defined below. To
define this system of coupled networks more formally, we
adopt the multitype network formalism of [45, 53]. Each
network a, b has its own degree distribution, pa(kaa, kab)
and pb(kba, kbb), where, for example, pa(kaa, kab) is the
fraction of nodes in network a with kaa neighbors in a and
kab in b. We generate realizations of multitype networks
with these degree distributions using a simple generaliza-
tion of the configuration model: all nodes repeatedly and
synchronously draw degree vectors (koa, kob) from their
degree distribution po (where o ∈ {a, b}), until the totals
of the internal degrees kaa, kbb are both even numbers and
the totals of the external degrees kab, kba are equal.[69]
We interconnect the random za, zb-regular graphs by
Bernoulli-distributed coupling : each node receives one
external “edge stub” with probability p and none with
probability 1 − p. Hence the degree distributions are
pa(za, 1) = p, pa(za, 0) = 1 − p, and pb(1, zb) =
p, pb(0, zb) = 1 − p. We denote this class of interacting
networks by the shorthand R(za)-B(p)-R(zb); we illus-
trate a small example of R(3)-B(0.1)-R(4) in Fig. 2.
FIG. 2: Random 3- and 4-regular graphs connected by
Bernoulli-distributed coupling with interconnectivity param-
eter p = 0.1 (R(3)-B(0.1)-R(4)). We also illustrate the shed-
ding branch distribution qab(rba,bb), the chance that an ab-
shedding causes rba, rbb many ba-, bb-sheddings at the next
time step. Note these random graphs are small and become
tree-like when they are large (' 1000 nodes).
C. Measures of avalanche size
We are most interested in the avalanche size distribu-
tions sa(ta, tb), sb(ta, tb), where, for example, sa(ta, tb) is
the chance that an avalanche begun in network a (indi-
cated by the subscript on sa) causes ta, tb many topplings
in networks a, b, respectively. These distributions count
the first toppling event, and they are defined asymptoti-
cally in that sa, sb are frequencies of avalanche sizes after
the networks have undergone many cascades. To study
sa and sb, we simulate sandpile avalanches and approxi-
mate them using a multitype branching process.
D. Multitype branching process approximation
In these next two sections, we present an overview
of our mathematical formulation, with details left to the
Materials and Methods. We develop a branching pro-
cess approximation that elucidates how sandpile cascades
spread in interconnected networks, advances theoretical
tools for cascades on multitype networks, justifies using
this model as an idealization of real infrastructure like
power grids, and establishes an open and relevant math-
ematical challenge. However, readers more interested in
the applications of the model may wish to skip to the
Results section.
Sandpile cascades on networks can be approximated
by a branching process provided that the network is lo-
cally tree-like (i.e., has few short cycles), so that branches
of a nascent cascade grow approximately independently.
The interacting networks R(za)-B(p)-R(zb) are tree-like
provided they are sparse and large enough (with at least
several hundred nodes), since the edges are wired uni-
formly at random. Power grids are approximately tree-
like: the clustering coefficient of power grids c and d,
for example, is C ≈ 0.05, an order of magnitude larger
than an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with equally many
nodes and edges, but still quite small. Although tree-
based approximations of other dynamical processes work
surprisingly well even on non-tree-like graphs, power grid
topologies were found to be among the most difficult to
predict with tree-based theories [5]. Here we find that
analytic, tree-based approximations of sandpile dynam-
ics agree well with simulations even on the real power
grid topologies (Figs. 3, S7, S8).
Cascades on interacting networks require a multitype
branching process, in which a tree grows according to
probability distributions of the number of events of var-
ious types generated from seed events. We consider two
basic event types, a-topplings and b-topplings—i.e., top-
pling events in networks a and in b. These simplify the
underlying branching process of sheddings, or grains of
sand shed from one network to another, of which there
are four types: aa-, ab-, ba- and bb-sheddings. (Note that
there is no distinction between topplings and sheddings
on one, isolated network, because sand can only be shed
from, say, a to a.)
A key property of sandpile dynamics on networks,
which enables the branching process calculations, is that
in simulations the amount of sand on a node is asymp-
totically uniformly distributed from zero to one less its
degree (i.e., there is no typical amount of sand on a
node) [48, 56]. Hence the chance that a grain arriving
at a node with degree k topples it equals the chance that
the node had k − 1 grains of sand, which is 1/k. So
sandpile cascades are approximated by what we call 1/k-
percolation: the cascade spreads from node u to node v
with probability inversely proportional to the degree of
v. This suggests a direct interpretation for infrastruc-
ture: important nodes have k times more connectivity
than unimportant (degree-1) nodes, so they are k times
6less likely to fail (they are presumably reinforced by en-
gineers). But when important nodes do fail, they cause
k times more repercussions (shedded grains of sand). We
found some evidence for this in the power flowing through
buses (nodes) in power grids: each additional degree cor-
relates with an additional 124 MVA of apparent power
flowing through it (R2 = 0.30; see Fig. S6 of the SI).
The details of the branching process analysis extend
the standard techniques as presented in the Materials and
Methods. We give here only the crux of the derivation.
Suppose a grain of sand is shed from network o ∈ {a, b}
to network d ∈ {a, b} (‘o’ for “origin network”, ‘d’ for
“destination network”). What is the chance that this
grain shed from o to d (an od-shedding) causes rda and
rdb many grains to be shed from network d to a and from
d to b, respectively, at the next time step? This probabil-
ity distribution, denoted qod(rda, rdb), is the branch (or
children) distribution of the branching process for shed-
dings. Figure 2 illustrates qab as an example. Neglect-
ing degree-degree correlations (the subject of so-called
P (k, k′) theory [5]), a grain shed from network o to d
arrives at an edge stub chosen uniformly at random, so
it arrives at a node with degree pd(rda, rdb) with proba-
bility proportional to rdo, since that node has rdo many
edges pointing to network o. Using this and the chance
of toppling found above (1/total degree), we approximate
asymptotically that
qod(rda, rdb) =
rdopd(rda, rdb)
〈kdo〉
1
rda + rdb
(1)
for rda + rdb > 0, where 〈kdo〉 is the expected number of
edges from d to o,
∑
kda,kdb
kdopd(kda, kdb). To normalize
qod, set
qod(0, 0) := 1−
∑
rda+rdb>0
qod(rda, rdb), (2)
which is the probability that the destination node does
not topple (i.e., that it has fewer grains than one less its
total degree).
Note that for an individual, isolated network the anal-
ogous branch distribution q(k) simplifies considerably: in
the equivalent of Eq. (1) there is a cancelation of k in the
numerator of with 1/k on the right [7–9]. Thus the ex-
pected number of children events 〈q(k)〉 = ∑k k kp(k)〈k〉 1k =
1. Each seed event gives rise to one child on average,
which then gives rise to one child on average, etc., which
is called a “critical” branching process. (If less than one
child on average, the branching process dies out; if more
than one it may continue indefinitely.) The branching
process approximations of sandpile cascades on the in-
teracting networks studied here—coupled random reg-
ular graphs a, b and power grids c, d—are also critical,
because the principle eigenvalue of the matrix of first
moments of the branch distributions is one.
The branching process of sheddings is high dimen-
sional, with four types aa, ab, ba, bb recording origin and
destination networks. Transforming the shedding branch
distributions qod to the toppling branch distributions
ua, ub is easy; the key is that a node topples if and only
if it sheds at least one grain of sand (for the details, see
the Materials and Methods). This also halves the dimen-
sions of the branching process of topplings, simplifying
calculations.
E. Self-consistency equations
We analyze implicit equations for the avalanche size
distributions sa, sb using generating functions [57]. De-
note the generating functions associated to the toppling
branch distributions ua, ub and the avalanche size distri-
butions sa, sb by capital letters U and S; for example,
Ua(τa, τb) :=
∞∑
ta,tb=0
ua(ta, tb)τ
ta
a τ
tb
b for τda, τdb ∈ C.
The theory of multitype branching processes [58] implies
the self-consistency equations
Sa = τa Ua(Sa,Sb), Sb = τb Ub(Sa,Sb), (3)
where each S is evaluated at (τa, τb). In words, the left-
hand equation in (3) says that to obtain the distribution
of the sizes of cascades begun in a, the cascade begins
with an a-toppling (hence the τa out front), which causes
at the next time step a number of a- and b-topplings
distributed according to Ua, and these topplings in turn
cause numbers of a- and b-topplings distributed according
to Sa and Sb.
We wish to solve Eqs. (3) for Sa and Sb, because their
coefficients are the avalanche size distributions sa, sb of
interest. In practice, however, these implicit equations
are transcendental and difficult to invert. Instead, we
solve Eqs. (3) with computer algebra systems using three
methods—iteration, Cauchy integral formula, and multi-
dimensional Lagrange inversion [13]—to compute exactly
hundreds of coefficients; for details, see the Materials and
Methods. Figure 3 shows good agreement between sim-
ulation of sandpile cascades on power grids c, d and the
branching process approximation (obtained by iterating
Eqs. (3) seven times starting from Sa = Sb = 1, with
branch distributions calculated from the empirical degree
distributions of c, d). For more details on the agreement,
including how the degrees of nodes with external links ac-
count for the characteristic “blips” in the avalanche size
distributions of the power grids, see Figs. S7 and S8 of
the SI.
These numerical methods are computationally fea-
sible for the probabilities of the smallest avalanches,
but we are most interested in the probabilities of the
largest avalanches—that is, in the asymptotic behav-
iors of sa(ta, tb), sb(ta, tb) as ta, tb → ∞. Unfortunately
the technique used for an isolated network—an expan-
sion at a singularity of U—fails for sandpile cascades
on Bernoulli-coupled random regular graphs and for the
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FIG. 3: The multitype branching process (red curves) approx-
imates simulations of sandpile cascades on the power grids
c, d (blue curves) surprisingly well, given that power grids
are among the most difficult network topologies on which to
predict other dynamics [5]. We plot the four marginalized
avalanche size distributions in order to view one-dimensional
curves (and here we label power grids c, d as a, b, respectively).
power grids, because their generating functions have sin-
gularities at infinity and none in the finite plane (see
Materials and Methods). Generalizing these asymptotic
techniques to “multitype cascades” with singularities at
infinity poses an outstanding mathematical challenge.
Nevertheless, three tactics—simulations, computer cal-
culations of coefficients of Sa,Sb, and analytical calcula-
tions of the first moments of the branch and avalanche
size distributions—suffice to obtain interesting conclu-
sions about the effect of interdependence on critical cas-
cades of load, as discussed next.
II. RESULTS
A. Locally stabilizing effect of interconnections
We first answer the question, would an isolated net-
work suppress its largest cascades of load by connect-
ing to another network? For coupled random regular
graphs R(za)-B(p)-R(zb), yes: increasing interconnectiv-
ity p suppresses an individual network’s largest cascades,
but only up to a critical point p∗ (Fig. 4).
First we introduce notation. For a cascade that begins
in network a, the random variables Taa, Tab are the sizes
of the “local” and “inflicted” cascades: the number of
topplings in a and in b, respectively. For example, a cas-
cade that begins in a and that topples 10 a-nodes and 5
b-nodes corresponds to Taa = 10, Tab = 5. We denote Ta
to the be random variable for the size of a cascade in net-
work a, without distinguishing where the cascade begins.
(We define Tba, Tbb, Tb analogously.) Dropping sand uni-
formly at random on two networks of equal size means
that avalanches begin with equal probability in either
network, so Pr(Ta = ta) =
∑
tb
(sa(ta, tb) + sb(ta, tb))/2.
In Fig. 4 we plot the probability of observing a large
avalanche in a (that topples at least half of all its nodes)
as a function of interconnectivity p, as measured in nu-
merical simulations on the R(3)-B(p)-R(3) topology. We
distinguish between those avalanches that begin in a
(blue “local cascades”), begin in b (red “inflicted cas-
cades”), or in either network (gold). With increasing
interconnectivity p, large inflicted cascades from a to b
(red curve) increase in frequency due in large part to
the greater ease of avalanches traversing the intercon-
nections between networks. More interesting is that in-
creasing interconnectivity suppresses large local cascades
(blue curve) for small p, but amplifies them for large
p. The 80% drop in Pr(Taa > 1000) and 70% drop in
Pr(Ta > 1000) from p = 0.001 to p
∗ ≈ 0.075 ± 0.01
are the locally stabilizing effects of coupling networks.
The left inset to Fig. 4 is the rank-size plot showing
the sizes of the largest avalanches and their decrease
with initially increasing p, and the same holds for sim-
ulations on the power grids c and d (right inset).[70]
The curve Pr(Ta > C) and the location of its criti-
cal point p∗ in Fig. 4 is robust to changing the cutoff
C ∈ [400, 1500]. Thus a network such as a seeking to
minimize its largest cascades would seek interconnectiv-
ity that minimizes Pr(Ta > C), which we estimate to be
p∗ ≈ 0.075± 0.01 for R(3)-B(p)-R(3) with 2× 103 nodes
per network.
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FIG. 4: Interconnectivity is locally stabilizing, but only up
to a critical point. The main plot, the results of simula-
tions on R(3)-B(p)-R(3) (2 × 106 grains, f = .01, 2 × 103
nodes/network), shows that large local cascades decrease and
increase with p, while large inflicted cascades only become
more likely. Their average (gold curve) has a stable mini-
mum at p∗ ≈ 0.075 ± 0.01. This curve and its critical point
is stable to cutoffs c different from 1000 (400 ≤ x ≤ 1500).
Inset figures: rank-size plots on log-log scales of the largest
cascades in network a (left) for p = 10−3, 10−2, 10−1 and in
power grid d connected to c by 0, 8 or 16 edges. Both cases
are in the regime of sparse interconnectivity (left-hand side
of main plot), as greater interconnectivity suppresses large
cascades in an individual network.
This central result appears to be generic: changing the
system size, internal degrees, or type of degree distribu-
tion (so long as it remains narrow) may slightly change
8p∗ but not the qualitative shape of Fig. 4 (see SI Figs.
S1, S2). Furthermore, this effect of optimal connectiv-
ity is unique to interconnected networks: adding edges
to a single, isolated network does not reduce the chance
of a large cascade (and hence produce a minimum like
in Fig. 4). (This is expected since s(t) ∼ t−3/2 for all
narrow degree distributions [7].) Whereas adding links
within a network can only increase its vulnerability to
large cascades, adding links to another network can re-
duce it. Note that we cannot derive analytical results
for Fig. 4 because the standard techniques for single net-
works fail for multitype generating functions with singu-
larities at infinity, and inverting Eq. (3) numerically is
practical only for exactly computing the probabilities of
small cascades (Ta < 50) and not large ones (Ta > 10
3)
(see the Materials and Methods). These pose open and
relevant mathematical challenges for future work.
Intuitively, adding connections between networks di-
verts load, and that diverted load tends to be absorbed
by the neighboring network rather than amplified and re-
turned, as most cascades in isolated networks are small.
One way to see the diversion of load is in the first mo-
ments of the toppling branch distributions ua, ub. For
R(za)-B(p)-R(zb), the average numbers of topplings at
the next time step in the same and neighboring networks,
respectively, decrease and increase with the interconnec-
tivity p as 〈ua〉a = 1 − p/(1 + za), 〈ua〉b = p/(1 + zb),
where, for example, 〈ua〉a ≡
∑
ta,tb
taua(ta, tb).
However, introducing too many interconnections is
detrimental as shown in Fig. 4. Interconnections let
diverted load more easily return and with catastrophic
effect. In addition, each interconnection augments the
networks’ capacity and hence average load, so that large
avalanches increase in frequency in individual networks
and in the collection of networks, as discussed next.
B. Globally destabilizing effect of interconnections
Adding interconnections amplifies large global cas-
cades. That is, the largest avalanches in the collection
of networks—viewed as one system with just one type
of node—increase in size with interconnectivity. Here we
are interested in the total avalanche size distribution s(t),
the chance of t topplings overall in a cascade. Figure 5
shows the extension of the right-hand tail of s(t) in sim-
ulations on R(3)-B(p)-R(3) with increasing interconnec-
tivity p. The rank-size plot inset shows more explicitly
that the largest avalanches increase with p. Similar re-
sults occur in simulations on power grids c, d (see page 2
of the SI).
What amplifies the global cascades most significantly
is the increase in total capacity (and hence average load
available for cascades) and not the increased interdepen-
dence between the networks. (Recall that capacities of
nodes are their degrees, so introducing new edges be-
tween networks increments those nodes’ degrees and ca-
pacities.) To see this effect on coupled random regular
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FIG. 5: Increasing the interconnectivity p between two ran-
dom 3-regular graphs extends the tail of the total avalanche
size distribution s(t), which does not distinguish whether
nodes are in network a or b but considers them as one net-
work. The inset shows a rank-size plot on log-log scales of
the number of topplings t in the largest 104 avalanches (with
2×106 grains of sand dropped), confirming that adding more
edges between random 3-regular graphs enlarges the largest
global cascades by an amount on the order of the additional
number of interconnections.
graphs, we perform the following rewiring experiment.
Beginning with two isolated random regular graphs, each
node changes one of its internal edge stubs to be exter-
nal with probability p. The degree distributions become,
for example, pa(za − 1, 1) = p, pa(za, 0) = 1 − p, which
we call “Correlated-Bernoulli coupling” because the in-
ternal and external degrees are not independent. Figure
S4 of the SI shows that the largest global avalanches are
not significantly enlarged with increasing “rewired inter-
connectivity” p for random 3-regular graphs with such
coupling. Furthermore, the enlargement of the largest
cascades observed in the rank-size plot in the inset of
Fig. 5 is on the order of the extra average load result-
ing from the additional interconnectivity (and the same
holds for simulations on the power grids).
The amplification of global avalanches, though rel-
atively small, is relevant for infrastructure: addi-
tional capacity and demand often accompany—and even
motivate—the construction of additional interconnec-
tions [11, 13]. Furthermore, in reality it is more common
to augment old infrastructure with new interconnections
as in Fig. 1 (Bernoulli coupling) rather than to delete an
existing internal connection and rewire it to span across
networks (Correlated-Bernoulli coupling). Thus, build-
ing new interconnections augments the entire system’s
capacity, and hence average load, and hence largest cas-
cades.
9C. Interconnectivity that mitigates cascades of
different sizes
Figure 4 shows that networks seeking to mitigate
their large avalanches seek optimal interconnectivity
p. Networks mitigating their small or intermediate
cascades would seek different optimal interconnectivity
p, as shown in Fig. 6 (the results of simulations on
R(3)-B(p)-R(3)). Figure 6A shows that the probabil-
ity of a small cascade in network a (1 ≤ Ta ≤ 51)
increases monotonically with p, so that networks miti-
gating the smallest cascades seek isolation, p = 0. By
contrast, the chance of a cascade of intermediate size,
100 ≤ Ta ≤ 150 (Fig. 6B), has a local maximum at
p∗ ≈ 0.05, so networks mitigating intermediate cascades
would demolish all interconnections (p = 0) or build as
many as possible (p = 1). By contrast, the largest cas-
cades 400 ≤ Ta ≤ 1500 (Figs. 6C, 6D) occur with min-
imal probability at p∗ ≈ 0.075 ± 0.01. For more plots
showing the change in concavity and the robustness of
the stable critical point p∗ for large cascades, see Fig.
S3.
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FIG. 6: Networks mitigating the smallest cascades 1 ≤ Ta ≤
51 (A) seek isolation p = 0, while networks suppressing inter-
mediate cascades 100 ≤ Ta ≤ 150 (B) seek isolation p = 0 or
strong coupling p = 1, depending on the initial interconnec-
tivity p in relation to the unstable critical point p∗ ≈ 0.05.
But networks like power grids mitigating large cascades (C,
D) would seek interconnectivity at the stable equilibrium
p∗ ≈ 0.075 ± 0.01. The bottom figures and the location of
p∗ are robust to changes in the window ` ≤ Ta ≤ ` + 50 for
all 400 ≤ ` ≤ 1500.
Other models of cascades in power grids conclude that
upgrading and repairing the system to mitigate the small-
est blackouts may increase the risk of the largest black-
outs [6]. Similarly, extinguishing small forest fires, a com-
mon policy in the 20th century, increases forest vegeta-
tion and thus the risk of large forest fires—a phenomenon
known as the “Yellowstone effect” [32]. The results here
augment these conclusions to include interconnectivity.
Networks building interconnections in order to suppress
their large cascades cause larger global cascades (by an
amount on the order of the additional capacity). Net-
works suppressing their small or intermediate cascades
may seek isolation (p = 0), which amplifies their large
cascades, or (for intermediate cascades) strong coupling
(p = 1), which amplifies both large local and global cas-
cades.
D. Capacity disparity
Two networks that are interdependent are rarely iden-
tical, as are the R(3)-B(p)-R(3) topologies studied thus
far, so we determine the effect of capacity disparity on
cascades. As the capacities of nodes are their degrees, we
study R(za)-B(p)-R(zb) with different internal degrees,
za 6= zb. We find that interdependence is more catas-
trophic for smaller capacity networks, in that they suffer
comparatively larger inflicted cascades. They still prefer
some interconnectivity, but less than the higher capacity
network.
Using the theoretical branching process approxima-
tion, we compute how much larger inflicted cascades
are from high- to low-capacity networks. Differentiating
Eqs. (3) with respect to τa, τb and setting τa = τb = 1
yields four linear equations for the first moments of
the avalanche size distributions sa, sb in terms of the
first moments of the branch distributions ua, ub. For
R(za)-B(p)-R(zb), the four first moments of sa, sb are
all infinite, as expected, because in isolation these net-
works’ avalanche size distributions are power laws with
exponent −3/2 [7–9]. Nevertheless, we can compare the
rates at which the average inflicted cascade sizes diverge
by computing their ratio
〈sa〉b
〈sb〉a =
1 + za
1 + zb
, (4)
where, e.g., 〈sa〉a ≡
∑
ta,tb
tasa(ta, tb) (see SI for the
derivation). Thus zb > za implies that the inflicted cas-
cades from b to a are larger on average than those from a
to b. Fig. S9 of the SI shows qualitative agreement with
simulations.
As a result of Eq. (4), the low-capacity network prefers
less interconnectivity than the high-capacity network. In
simulations of R(3)-B(p)-R(4), for instance, low capacity
network a prefers p∗a ≈ 0.05, whereas high-capacity b
prefers p∗b ≈ 0.3. For systems like power grids seeking to
mitigate their cascades of load, these results suggest an
arms race for greater capacity to fortify against cascades
inflicted by neighboring networks.
E. Incentives and equilibria in power grids
Since different networks have unique susceptibilities to
cascades (due to capacity disparity, for example), equi-
libria among real networks are more nuanced than on
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identical random graphs. Next we explore how the level
of interconnectivity and load disparity affect sandpile
cascades on the power grids c and d. (Although sand-
pile dynamics do not obey Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws
nor the flow of load from sources to sinks, as in phys-
ical power flow models (e.g., [16, 17]), they do closely
resemble some engineers’ models of blackouts, and black-
out data show evidence of criticality and power laws [6].)
To interpret results, we suppose that the owners of the
power grids c, d are rational, in that they wish to miti-
gate their largest cascades but care little about cascades
overwhelming neighboring grids.
To capture different amounts of demand, numbers of
redundancies, ages of infrastructure, susceptibility to sag-
ging power lines [16, 17], and other factors that affect the
rate at which cascades of load shedding and failures begin
in each network, we introduce a load disparity parameter
r as follows. Each node in c is r times more likely than
a node in d to receive a new grain of sand. Increasing r
intensifies the load on grid c, the rate at which cascades
begin there, and the sizes of the largest inflicted cascades
from c to d. The larger r is, the more volatile power grid
c becomes.
Given the spatial structure of the power grid networks,
there is no principled way to add arbitrarily many inter-
connections between them. However, three different lev-
els of interconnectivity are natural: (1) delete the eight
interconnections so that c and d are isolated, (2) leave
the eight original interconnections, and (3) add eight ad-
ditional interconnections in a way that mirrors the em-
pirical degree distribution.
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FIG. 7: The critical load disparity at which inflicted cascades
in d become equally large as its local cascades is r∗ ≈ 15
(for 16 interconnections (“bridges”)). (For 8 interconnections,
r∗ > 20; see Fig. S1 S1.4). Here we show a rank-size plot in
log-log scales of the largest 104 avalanches in power grid d,
distinguishing whether they begin in c (“inflicted cascades”)
or in d (“local cascades”), for 8 and 16 interconnections (solid,
dashed curves), for r = 1 (main), r = 15 (inset), in simula-
tions with dissipation of sand f = 0.05, 106 grains dropped
(after 105 transients).
Figure 7 shows that there are two ways to amplify the
largest inflicted cascades in d. The first is to increase the
number of interconnections (compare red to green-dashed
curve). The second is to increase r (compare distance
from green to gold curve in the main and in the inset).
At a critical r∗, the largest inflicted cascades in d that
begin in c (red and green curves) are equally large as the
largest local cascades in d that begin in d (blue and gold
curves). For 16 interconnections, we estimate r∗ ≈ 15
(inset of Fig. 7), and the inflicted cascades are larger and
smaller, respectively, for r = 10, 20 (Fig. S5)—indicating
that inflicted cascades begin to dominate local cascades
at r∗ ≈ 15. The actual load disparity between power
grids c and d is r ≈ 0.7, which we estimate by computing
the average power incident per node in simulation output
from FERC [49]. (There are, however, interdependent
power grids in the southeastern USA with r > 15.) Since
r = 0.7, the load is greater on grid d, so grid d prefers
more interconnections and c prefers fewer than if r were
1. Consequently, any equilibrium between the two grids
is frustrated (or semi-stable): only one grid can achieve
its desired interconnectivity.
III. DISCUSSION
We have presented a comprehensive study of sandpile
cascades on interacting networks to obtain a deeper un-
derstanding of cascades of load on interdependent sys-
tems, showing both the benefits and dangers of inter-
dependence. We combine a mathematical framework
for multitype networks [45, 53] with models of sand-
piles on isolated networks [7–12, 36] to derive a multi-
type branching process approximation of cascades of load
between simple interacting networks and between real
power grids. We show that some interdependence is ben-
eficial to a network, for it mitigates its largest avalanches
by diverting load to neighboring networks. But too much
interconnectivity opens new avenues for inflicted load and
adds capacity that fuels even larger cascades. The bene-
fits and detriments in mitigating large avalanches balance
at a critical amount of interconnectivity, which is a sta-
ble equilibrium for coupled networks with similar capaci-
ties. For coupled networks with asymmetric capacity, the
equilibria will be frustrated, in that the networks prefer
different optimal levels of interconnectivity.
We also show that tuning interconnectivity to sup-
press cascades of a certain range of sizes amplifies
the occurrence of cascades in other ranges. Thus a
network mitigating its small avalanches amplifies its
large ones (Fig. 4), and networks suppressing their own
large avalanches amplify large ones in the whole system
(Fig. 5). Similarly it has been found that mitigating
small electrical blackouts and small forest fires appears
to increase the risk of large ones [6, 32]. Furthermore,
the amplification of global cascades due to the increase
in capacity (Fig. 5) is a warning for new interconnections
among power grids (Fig. 1) [11, 13], financial sectors and
other infrastructure.
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These findings suggest economic and game-theoretic
implications for infrastructure. (Note that here we con-
sider the strategic interactions of entire networks rather
than of individual nodes in one network, which is more
standard, e.g., [60].) For example, a power grid owner
wishing to mitigate the largest cascades in her grid would
desire some interconnections to other grids, but not too
many. However, what benefits individual grids can harm
society: grids building interconnections amplify global
cascades in the entire system. More detailed models that
combine results like these with economic and physical
considerations of electrical grids and with costs of build-
ing connections may provide more realistic estimates of
optimal levels of interconnectivity. Our framework—
which models a dynamical process on stable, underlying
network topologies—could also be combined with models
of topological failure in interdependent networks [20–22].
Those studies conclude that systemic risk of connectiv-
ity failure increases monotonically with interdependence
(“dependency links”). Whether suppressing cascades of
load or of connectivity failures is more important might
suggest whether to interconnect some (p∗ > 0) [Fig. 4] or
none (p = 0) [20–22], respectively. Our results are con-
sistent with recent work showing that an intermediate
amount of connectivity minimizes risk of systemic de-
fault in credit networks [61], in contrast to Refs. [20–22]
and the more traditional view that risk increases mono-
tonically with connectivity in credit networks (e.g., [62]).
This work also advances our mathematical understand-
ing of dynamical processes on multitype networks. Since
networks with one type of node and edge are impover-
ished views of reality, researchers have begun to study
dynamical processes on multitype networks, such as on
modular graphs [42–45]. Here we derive a branching
process approximation of sandpile cascades on multitype
networks starting from the degree distributions, and we
discuss open problems in solving for the asymptotic be-
havior of the generating functions’ coefficients, which
elude current techniques for isolated networks. We ex-
pect that the computational techniques used here to solve
multidimensional generating function equations, such as
multidimensional Lagrange inversion [13], will find other
uses in percolation and cascades in multitype networks.
Finally, in the Appendix we derive the effective degree
distributions in multitype networks, which expands the
admissible degree distributions that others have consid-
ered. The machinery we develop considers just two in-
teracting networks, a and b, or equivalently one network
with two types of nodes. However, this extends to finitely
many types, which may be useful for distinguishing types
of nodes—such as buses, transformers and generators
in electrical grids—or for capturing geographic informa-
tion in a low-dimensional way without storing explicit
locations—such as buses in the interiors of power grids
and along boundaries between them.
Here we have focused on mitigating large avalanches in
modular networks, but other applications may prefer to
amplify large cascades, such as the adoption of products
in modular social networks [63] or propagating response-
driven surveys across bottlenecks between social groups
[64]. Cascades in social networks like these may require
networks with triangles or other subgraphs added [54, 65,
66]; inverting the resulting multidimensional generating
function equations for dynamics on these networks would
require similar multitype techniques.
We expect that this work will stimulate calculations of
critical points in interconnectivity among networks sub-
jected to other dynamics, such as linearized power flow
equations in electrical grids [16, 17] and other domain-
specific models. As critical infrastructures such as power
grids, transportation, communication, banks and mar-
kets become increasingly interdependent, resolving the
risks of large cascades and the incentives that shape them
becomes ever more important.
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Power grid topologies
To understand coupling between multiple grids we
requested data from the US Federal Energy Regulation
Commission [49]. Using output of power simulations on
many connected “areas” (distinct grids owned by differ-
ent utilities) in the southeastern USA, we chose grid d by
selecting the grid with the highest average internal degree
and the grid, c, to which it had the most interconnections
(8). Grids c, d have 439 and 504 buses (nodes) and aver-
age internal degrees 2.40 and 2.91. For our purposes here,
the only important details are the narrow degree distri-
butions, the low clustering coefficients and the number of
interconnections between the grids. Other details about
the grids are in the SI.
B. Toppling branch distributions
To reduce the number of types in the branching pro-
cess, we count the number of toppling events in each
network rather than the number of grains of sand shed
from one network to another. Here we derive the toppling
branch distributions ua, ub from the shedding branch dis-
tributions qod. (For instance, ua(ta, tb) is the chance that
a toppled node in a causes ta, tb many nodes in a, b to
topple at the next time step.) Note that a node topples
if and only if it sheds at least one grain of sand. Thus
a grain traveling from a network o to network d top-
ples its destination node with probability 1 − qod(0, 0).
Denoting (0, 0) by 0 and the Binomial distribution by
βnk (p) ≡
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k, we have
ua(ta, tb) =
∞∑
ka=ta
∞∑
kb=tb
pa(ka, kb)β
ta
ka
(1− qaa(0))βkbtb (1− qab(0)),
since the node must have at least ta many a-neighbors
and at least tb many b-neighbors, only ta, tb of which
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topple (which are binomially distributed). The expres-
sion for ub is analogous. As an example, the probability
generating function of ua for Bernoulli-coupled random
regular graphs R(za)-B(p)-R(zb) is
Ua(τa, τb) = (p− pτa + (za + 1)(τa + za − 1))
za(1 + p(τb − 1) + zb)
(za + 1)zaz
za
a (zb + 1)
.
C. Three methods for numerically solving the
multidimensional self-consistency equations of a
multitype branching process
The most na¨ıve method to solve the self-consistency
equations of a multitype branching process (such as Eqs.
(3)) is to use a computer algebra system like Mathemat-
ica or Maple to iterate (3) symbolically starting from
Sa = Sb = 1, expand the result, and collect coefficients.
To obtain the coefficient sa(ta, tb) exactly, it suffices to
iterate (3) at least ta + tb + 1 times. What is more, just
a handful of iterations partially computes the tails (co-
efficients of terms with high powers in Sa,Sb), but the
amount of missing probability mass in the tails is unde-
termined. This method was used in Fig. 3.
A second method is to symbolically iterate Eqs. (3)
at least ta + tb + 1 times and to use Cauchy’s integral
formula
sa(ta, tb) =
1
(2pii)2
∫∫
D
Sa(τa, τb)
τ ta+1a τ
tb+1
b
dτadτb, (5)
where D ⊂ C2 is a Cartesian product of circular contours
centered at the origin, each of radius r smaller than the
modulus of the pole of Sa closest to the origin [13]. Then
calculate one coefficient at a time using
sa(ta, tb) =
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
Sa(reiθ, reiψ)
rta+tbei(taθ+tbψ)
dθdψ.
A third method is Lagrange inversion, generalized to
multiple dimensions by I. J. Good in 1960 [13], a re-
sult that has seen little use in the networks literature.
We state the theorem in the language of the two-type
branching process considered here, with the notation
~τ ≡ (τa, τb), ~S ≡ (Sa,Sb) and ~U ≡ (Ua,Ub). For the
slightly more general result that holds for arbitrary, fi-
nite, initial population, see Ref. [13].
Theorem 1 [Good 1960] If ~U(~τ) is analytic in a neigh-
borhood of the origin and ~U(~τ) 6= 0 (i.e., every type has a
positive probability of being barren), then for x ∈ {0, 1},
Sa(~τ)xSb(~τ)1−x =
∞∑
ma,mb=0
τmaa τ
mb
b
ma!mb!
[
∂ma+mb
∂κmaa ∂κ
mb
b
{
κxaκ
1−x
b ×
(6)
× Ua(~κ)maUb(~κ)mb
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣δνµ − κµUµ ∂Uµ∂κµ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣}]
~κ=0
,
where µ, ν run over the types {a, b}, δνµ is the Kronecker
delta, and || · || is the determinant.
Taking x = 0 gives Sb, while taking x = 1 gives Sa. In
practice, hundreds of terms of Sa,Sb can be computed
exactly by truncating the sum in (6) and using computer
algebra systems.
D. Solving for the coefficients asymptotically (and
why standard techniques fail)
To determine the asymptotic behaviors of
sa(ta, tb), sb(ta, tb) as ta, tb → ∞, the trick is to
solve for the inverses of Sa and Sb and to expand those
inverses S−1a and S−1b at the singularities of Sa and Sb.
This technique works for isolated networks [7–9, 14],
but Sa and Sb have no finite singularities in C2 for
Bernoulli-coupled random regular graphs nor for power
grids c, d.
We demonstrate this failure of standard asymptotic
techniques on the networks R(za)-B(p)-R(zb). Let ~ω :=
~S(~τ). Assuming an inverse ~S−1 of ~S exists, using (3) we
have
~τ = ~S−1(~ω) = ~ω
~U(~ω) =
(
ωa
Ua(~ω) ,
ωb
Ub(~ω)
)
. (7)
The generating functions Sa,Sb have singularities at
~τ∗, ~µ∗, respectively, if ~DS−1a (~τ∗) = ~DS−1b (~µ∗) = (0, 0),
where the operator ~D = (∂/∂ωa, ∂/∂ωb) is a vector of
partial derivatives. Differentiating Eq. (7) and equating
the numerators to 0 gives
Ua(~τ∗)− τ∗a
∂Ua
∂τa
(~τ∗) = 0, −τ∗a
∂Ua
∂τb
(~τ∗) = 0, (8a)
Ub(~µ∗)− µ∗b
∂Ub
∂τb
(~µ∗) = 0, −µ∗b
∂Ub
∂τb
(~µ∗) = 0. (8b)
The only solution to Eqs. (8) is
~τ∗1 =
(
z2a + p− 1
p− za − 1 ,
p− zb − 1
p
)
−−−→
p→0
(∞, 1− za), (9a)
~µ∗1 =
(
p− za − 1
p
,
z2b + p− 1
p− zb − 1
)
−−−→
p→0
(1− zb,∞). (9b)
This solution (9) does not recover the singularities ~τ∗ =
(1, c1), ~µ
∗ = (c2, 1) (where c1, c2 are arbitrary) that we
should obtain when the networks are isolated (p = 0) [7].
Moreover, although Eqs. (8) vanish at the solutions (9),
the derivatives of (7) do not vanish at these solutions
(9), as ~DS−1a (~τ∗1 ) = (∞, 0), ~DS−1b (~µ∗1) = (0,∞). Thus
we must discard solutions (9).
Solving only the left-hand equations in Eqs. (8) yields
singularities that do recover the correct singularities
when p = 0:
~τ∗2 =
(
z2a + p− 1
(1− za)(p− 1− za) , τb
)
−−−→
p→0
(1, τb), (10a)
~µ∗2 =
(
µa,
z2b + p− 1
(1− zb)(p− 1− zb)
)
−−−→
p→0
(µa, 1), (10b)
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where τb, µa are arbitrary constants satisfying
τb 6= p− zb − 1
p
, µa 6= p− za − 1
p
, (11)
so that the derivatives of ~S−1(~ω) (8) evaluated at (10) are
finite. However, the derivatives on the right-hand sides
of Eqs. (8) evaluated at the solutions (10) are
∂S−1a
∂ωb
(τ∗2 ) =
(
0,
p (zb + 1)
(
z2a + p− 1
) ( z2a−1
z2a+p−1
)za
(1− za) (1− p+ za) (p (ωb − 1) + zb + 1)2
)
and similarly for ∂S−1b /∂ωa(µ∗2) (interchange a and b).
This derivative vanishes if and only if p = 0 or p = 1−z2a
or za = 1 or ωb = ∞. Hence we cannot find finite sin-
gularities of Sa,Sb; these generating functions are en-
tire functions with singularities only at τb = µa = ∞,
τa 6= z
2
a+p−1
p−za−1 , µb 6=
z2b+p−1
p−zb−1 . Hence we have no singu-
larities at which to do an asymptotic expansion for the
coefficients sa, sb, as one can for isolated networks [7–
9, 14].
Other techniques exist for asymptotically approximat-
ing the coefficients of generating functions, depending on
the type of the singularity ([57] §5). Hayman’s method
([57] §5.4) works for generating functions with no singu-
larities in the finite plane (i.e., entire functions), like the
Sa,Sb considered here. However, the theorem requires a
closed form expression for the generating function, which
we cannot obtain from the self-consistency equations for
the synthetic and real interacting networks of interest.
Developing techniques for asymptotically approximating
the coefficients of multidimensional generating functions
with singularities at infinity, like those studied here, poses
an important challenge for future studies of dynamical
processes on multitype networks.
V. APPENDIX: EFFECTIVE DEGREE
DISTRIBUTIONS IN MULTITYPE NETWORKS
Using the configuration model to generate multitype
networks—including bipartite and multipartite graphs,
graphs with arbitrary distributions of subgraphs, and the
modular graphs considered here—requires matching edge
stubs within and among types. For example, for the in-
teracting networks considered here, the number of edge
stubs pointing from network a to network b must equal
the number from b to a. A standard practice in the lit-
erature [45, 54] that is more restrictive than needed is
to require that the averages of the inter-degrees over the
degree distributions agree (e.g., 〈kab〉 = 〈kba〉 for two net-
works a, b of equal size). In fact, most any degree distri-
butions can be used, as long as conditioning on matching
edge stubs among the types of nodes leaves some proba-
bility. Requiring that the degree distributions satisfy, for
example, 〈kab〉 = 〈kba〉, merely tips the scales in favor of
valid degree sequences.
Here we derive the effective degree distribution in mul-
titype networks generated with the configuration model.
The idea is simple: since nodes draw degrees indepen-
dently, the probability distribution of the total number
of edge stubs from, say, network a to b is given by a con-
volution of the degree distribution. We state it for the
two interacting networks considered here, but it can be
easily generalized to, say, role distributions [54], which
require matching edge stubs with ratios different from
one.
Suppose networks a, b have Na, Nb many nodes, re-
spectively. Let ~Kab, ~Kba be the random variables for
the sequences of “inter-degrees” kab, kba of the nodes in
networks a, b, respectively, drawn from the input degree
distributions pa(kaa, kab), pb(kba, kbb). Suppose, for sim-
plicity, that the internal and external degrees are inde-
pendent (pa(kaa, kab) = paa(kaa)pab(kab), pb(kba, kbb) =
pba(kba)pbb(kbb)), although this is not essential. We de-
note Σ~k ≡∑ni=1 ki for ~k ∈ Zn.
Lemma 1 With the assumptions in the previous para-
graph, the effective inter-degree distribution for network
a is not the input one, Pr( ~Kab = ~k) =
∏Na
i=1 pab(ki), but
rather the conditional probability distribution
Pr( ~Kab = ~k | Σ ~Kba = Σ ~Kab) = Pr( ~Kab = ~k)
p∗ba
(
Σ~k
)∑
` p
∗
ab(`)p
∗
ba(`)
,
where p∗ab(·), p∗ba(·) are pab, pba convolved Na, Nb times,
respectively.
Proof. Using the independence of ~Kab and ~Kba, we
have
Pr( ~Kab = ~k | Σ ~Kba = Σ ~Kab) = Pr(
~Kab = ~k) Pr(Σ ~Kba = Σ~k)
Pr(Σ ~Kba = Σ ~Kab)
.
In the numerator we recognize Pr(Σ ~Kba = Σ~k) to be pba
convolved Nb times, evaluated at Σ~k. In the denomina-
tor, use independence, recognize convolutions and sum
on ` ≥ 0. 
Lemma 1 shows that the effective inter-degree distri-
bution of a is the input degree distribution pab reduced
by an amount given by a fraction of convolutions. This
reduction in probability governs how many invalid de-
gree sequences must be generated before generating a
valid one. For systems sizes on the order of 104 nodes, as
considered here, generating degree sequences until pro-
ducing a valid one is quite feasible, as it takes merely
seconds. However, for millions of nodes or more, it is
better to generate degree sequences ~Kab, ~Kba once, and
then repeatedly choose a node uniformly at random to
redraw its degree from its degree distribution until the
degree sequences are valid. However, this method does
not escape the effect in Lemma 1, which is often subtle
but can be substantial if the supports of the convolutions
of the degree distributions have little overlap. The inter-
degree distributions used here, Bernoulli and Correlated-
Bernoulli with identical expected total inter-degree, have
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“much overlap”, so the effective inter-degree distribution
is approximately the input one, and the correction factor
in Lemma 1 can be neglected.
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Supporting information
S1. ROBUSTNESS OF OPTIMAL
INTERCONNECTIVITY
S1.1. How p∗ depends on system size, connectivity,
type of degree distribution
Our central result is the minimum p∗ > 0 in the chance
of a large cascade in a network with a fraction p of its
nodes connected to nodes in another network. Impor-
tant questions are how p∗ depends on system size, be-
haves in the thermodynamic limit (infinite system size),
and depends on the internal degrees and on the degree
distribution. Here we show that the qualitative form of
Pr(Ta > C) in Fig. 4 appears to be generic.
Doubling the system size and keeping the cutoff C and
the dissipation f fixed (at C = half the number nodes in
a and at f = 0.01) does not significantly change Fig. 4,
because the dissipation f limits the chance of large cas-
cades. But doubling the system size, doubling the cutoff
C and halving the dissipation f (so that the largest cas-
cades topple nearly the whole system) slightly decreases
p∗. Figure S1 shows similar results as Fig. 4 but for a sys-
tem half the size (1000 nodes/network, f = 0.02, cutoff
C = 500). In the thermodynamic limit of infinite sys-
tem size N , we expect p∗ to stay bounded away from 0,
because what appears to be the determinant is the ra-
tio of edges between the networks (pN) and within them
(zaN).
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FIG. S1: For half the system size (Na = 1000), half the cutoff
(C = 500) and double the dissipation (f = 0.02) of the system
in Fig. 4, the chance of a large cascade in a is qualitatively
similar, and p∗ ≈ 0.12± 0.02 is slightly larger (in simulations
with 2 × 106 grains dropped after 105 transients). This gold
curve and its critical point is stable to cutoffs C different from
500 (200 ≤ C ≤ 800). Inset figures: rank-size plots on log-
log scales of the largest cascades in network a (left) for p =
10−3, 10−2, 10−1 and in power grid d connected to c by 0, 8
or 16 edges.
Increasing the internal degrees of nodes (say, to cou-
pled random 4-regular graphs R(4)-B(p)-R(4)) increases
their capacity and hence ability to withstand inflicted
cascades, so the minimum in Pr(Ta > C) is therefore
larger, p∗ ≈ 0.2 (Fig. S2), compared to p∗ ≈ 0.12 for ran-
dom 3-regular graphs with equally many nodes (Fig. S1).
The networks also have a wider range of optimal p, as ex-
pected, given that pNa external edges is less significant
than the zaNa internal edges when za = 4 (Fig. S2) com-
pared to za = 3 (Figs. 4 and S1). Nonetheless, the chance
of a large cascade eventually increases with p. We also
note that power grids more closely resemble random 3-
regular than 4-regular graphs (see Table S2 S2.1 below).
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FIG. S2: Increasing the internal degrees of both networks
a, b from 3 to 4 (i.e., R(4)-B(p)-R(4)) slightly increases the
minimum p∗ ≈ 0.2 of the chance of a large cascade in network
a. (Here: 103 nodes/network; f = 0.02; 106 grains dropped
after 105 transients.)
Next we determined the effect of introducing some de-
gree heterogeneity by adjusting interconnectivity p be-
tween two Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs. Similar results,
were obtained as for random regular graphs indicating
that some degree heterogeneity does not affect these re-
sults. (We did not test heavy-tailed degree distributions,
since these rarely occur in the physical infrastructure net-
works of interest, namely power grids.)
Finally, we tested whether adding edges at random to a
random regular graph produces an optimal connectivity
that minimizes the chance of a large cascade. Specifi-
cally, each node in a 3-random regular graph gains an
extra, fourth edge stub independently with probability p
(i.e., degree distribution P (k) is P (3) = 1−p, P (4) = p).
We find in simulations that Pr(T > 500) for a system
of 103 nodes is largely independent of the mean degree
z. In particular, the chance of a large cascade does not
drop, as it does when initially adding edges between two
networks (Figs. 4, S1, S2). This agrees with theoreti-
cal results for isolated networks [7]: the avalanche size
distribution s(t) ∼ t−3/2 for large t. We conclude that
adding links between two networks affects vulnerability to
large cascades in a different way than adding links within
isolated networks.
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S1.2. Unstable p∗ for small cascades, stable p∗ for
large cascades
Networks seeking to mitigate cascades of small, inter-
mediate or large sizes would seek different interconnec-
tivity, as shown in the plots of Pr(` ≤ Ta ≤ ` + 50) as a
function of p in Fig. 6. In Fig. S3 we show more plots to
show the change in concavity at intermediate cascade size
and the robustness of the location of the stable minimum
p∗ ≈ 0.075 for R(3)-B(p)-R(3).
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FIG. S3: Plots of Pr(` ≤ Ta ≤ `+ 50), for ` = 50, 150, ..., 850,
as a function of interconnectivity p ∈ [0, 0.5], in simulations on
R(3)-B(p)-R(3) with 2 × 106 grains, 2 × 103 nodes/network,
f = 0.01. Intermediate cascades (50 ≤ Ta ≤ 300) have an
unstable critical point p∗ ≈ 0.05, which changes concavity for
cascades of size approximately 350. Large cascades Ta ≥ 500
have an stable critical point p∗ ≈ 0.075.
S1.3. Increasing capacity fuels larger system-wide
cascades
Introducing new interconnections between networks
slightly enlarges the largest global cascades. We ask to
what extent is this due to the direction of links (pointing
internally or externally) and due to the additional capac-
ity for holding sand endowed by the new links (since ca-
pacities of nodes are their degrees). To isolate these two
effects, we run simulations on two random regular graphs
interconnected by “Correlated-Bernoulli” coupling: each
node changes an internal edge stub to an external edge
stub with probability p.
The resulting total avalanche size distribution,
Fig. S1 S1.3, does not significantly change for different
values of interconnectivity p. Thus, what causes the
slight enlargement of the largest global avalanches is the
slight increase in total capacity of the network, not the di-
rection of links. Moreover, the enlargement of the largest
global cascades is consistent with the increase in capac-
ity. For the simulations on random 3-regular graphs in
Fig. S1 S1.3, the nth largest avalanche contains on aver-
age 1.4±2.6 (mean ± standard deviation) more topplings
with p = .1 compared to p = .005, which is an insignifi-
cant difference. By contrast, in an analogous simulation
on R(3)-B(0.1)-R(3), in which we introduce extra links
with probability p, the nth largest avalanche contains
204.8± 92.5 more topplings than R(3)-B(0.005)-R(3), a
significant difference for networks with 103 nodes. Fur-
thermore, this difference is on the order of the additional
capacity of 2× 103 × (0.1− 0.005) = 190 among 2× 103
nodes with B(.1) compared to B(.005) coupling.
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FIG. S4: When nodes change exactly one of their inter-
nal edge stubs to be an external edge stub with probabil-
ity p (Regular(za)-Correlated-Bernoulli(p)-Regular(zb) rather
than receiving an external edge stub with probability p
(Regular(za)-Bernoulli(p)-Regular(zb)), global cascades are
not significantly amplified. This indicates that it is the small
increase in capacity (due to the additional edges and the fact
that capacities of nodes are their degrees) rather than the di-
rection of edges (internal versus external) that causes the in-
crease in global cascades with increased Bernoulli-distributed
coupling between networks. The main plot is the total
avalanche size distribution s(t) in a simulation with 106 grains
of sand dropped (after 105 grains dropped without collect-
ing statistics, begun from initial amounts of sand chosen uni-
formly at random from zero to one less a node’s degree) on
two networks with 103 nodes each, with dissipation of sand
f = 0.05 and za = zb = 3. Inset : rank-size plot of largest
5× 103 cascades, which are nearly indistinguishable.
We find similar results when introducing eight addi-
tional interconnections between power grids c and d. The
nth largest global cascades in simulations are larger by
an amount on the order of the additional capacity of the
two networks. Thus the additional capacity due to the
new interconnections, not the direction of links, largely
explains the amplification of system-wide cascades.
S1.4. Bounding the critical load disparity r∗ for
power grids c, d
In the main paper, we showed that for 16 intercon-
nections between power grids c and d, the critical load
disparity is r∗ ≈ 15. That is, when sand is dropped 15
times more frequently on c-nodes than on d-nodes, the
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largest inflicted cascades from c to d approximately equal
in size the largest local cascades begun in d. (Recall that
by “inflicted cascade from c to d” we mean the number of
topplings in d in an avalanche begun in c, and by “local
cascade in d” we mean the number of topplings in d in an
avalanche begun in d.) If d builds more interconnections
(or increases the load disparity r), the largest inflicted
cascades become larger than the largest local cascades.
On the other hand, delete interconnections (or decrease
the load disparity r), and d could mitigate its largest
local cascades more than the enlargement of the largest
inflicted cascades. Hence r∗ = 15 and 16 interconnec-
tions represent a “modularity equilibrium” in local and
inflicted cascades.
Here we use simulations to approximately bound the
critical load disparity 10 / r∗ / 20 for 16 interconnec-
tions between c and d. As shown in Fig. S1 S1.4, for
r = 10, 20 the largest inflicted cascades (green dashed)
are smaller and larger, respectively, than the largest lo-
cal cascades (gold dashed), indicating that 10 / r∗ / 20
for 16 interconnections. For 8 interconnections (solid
blue and red curves), the critical load disparity r∗ is ev-
idently larger than 20, as the largest inflicted cascades
are smaller than the largest local cascades for r = 20
(red curve below blue curve).
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FIG. S5: Same plot as in Fig. 7, but for load disparity r = 10
(main plot) and r = 20 (inset). For 16 edges between grids
c and d (dashed curves), the largest inflicted cascades from
grid c to d (green dashed curve) are slightly smaller than the
largest local cascades from d to itself (gold dashed curve) for
r = 10, indicating that r∗ ' 10. For r = 20 (inset), the
largest inflicted cascades are slightly larger than the largest
local cascades, indicating that r∗ / 20.
S2. POWER GRID TOPOLOGIES
S2.1. Power grids c and d
The readily available datasets on power grids—IEEE
test cases [1], Western States [2], and NYISO [3]—did
not appear to contain multiple electrical grids connected
to one another. As a result, we requested data on power
grid connectivity from the US Federal Energy Regulation
Commission (FERC) via the Critical Energy Infrastruc-
ture Information program [4]. We focused on the south-
eastern region of the United States, for which we had
the output files of power simulations of various grids.
The southeastern region consists of areas, distinct grids
owned by different utility companies. The largest areas
contain thousands of buses, an electrical grid term for the
connection points that link generators, transmission lines
and transformers. We ignore wind turbines, for they do
not belong to specific areas. Among the areas with at
least 100 nodes, we chose grids c and d by first selecting
the grid with the highest average internal degree (2.91),
and then selecting the area, c, to which it had the most
interconnections (8 of them). Grid d consists of one giant
component with 504 nodes, while grid c consists of one
giant component of size 439, and we ignore 14 additional
nodes.
Two of the statistics of power grids c and d are im-
portant to our study: the narrow degree distribution
and small clustering coefficient. Some details are in Ta-
ble S2 S2.1. The average clustering coefficient 〈C〉, the
fraction of possible triangles that exist, begins to mea-
sure how locally tree-like power grids are. We find that
〈C〉 ≈ 0.05 is low, yet an order of magnitude larger than
the clustering coefficient of a random 3-regular graph
with as many nodes as grid d. The average shortest path
length among pairs of nodes, 〈`〉, which has been iden-
tified as a likely source of difficulty for predicting cas-
cades on networks [5], is rather large in the power grids
(〈`〉 ≈ 10), due to their two-dimensional, spatial, nearly
planar structure. By contrast, random 3-regular graphs
have significantly smaller diameter 〈`〉 ≈ 7.09± 0.03.
c d c & d 3-Regular
# nodes 439 504 943 504
# internal edges 527 734 1261 756
# external edges 8 8 – –
〈kinternal〉 2.40 2.91 2.69 3
〈kexternal〉 .0205 .0179 – –
〈C〉 0.0109 0.0821 0.0488 0.003(2)
〈`〉 9.32 8.26 11.42 7.09(3)
TABLE S1: Summary statistics of power grids c and d (in
isolation and coupled together) and of a random 3-regular
graph (“3-Regular”) with the same number of nodes as d. The
statistics for the random 3-regular graph are averages over
1,000 realizations, with the standard deviation in parentheses
to convey the fluctuation in the last digit.
S2.2. Correlation between degree and load
In the sandpile model studied here, we choose the ca-
pacity of every node to be its degree, so that toppled
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nodes unambiguously shed one grain to each neighbor.
To examine the reasonableness of this assumption for real
infrastructure, we sum the apparent power on the edges
incident to each bus in power grids c and d, and we plot in
Fig. S2 S2.2 a density histogram of apparent power versus
degree of the nodes. Most buses have low degree and low
apparent power, and some buses have high degree but low
power, while others bear high power among few connec-
tions. But the general trend is positive: each additional
degree correlates with 123 MVA of additional apparent
power, though the correlation is tenuous (R2 = 0.30).
This suggests that using the sandpile model with capac-
ity equal to degree in order to study cascades of load in
power grids—and by extension other infrastructure—is
not unreasonable for the purpose of obtaining heuristic
understanding.
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FIG. S6: Apparent power versus node degree for power grids
c and d, showing a weak correlation between the degree of
nodes and their load. The best fit line power = −17.4 +
123.8k indicates that each additional degree k correlates with
an increase in apparent power of 123.8 MVA (R2 = 0.30).
S3. BRANCHING PROCESS APPROXIMATION
S3.1. Comparing theory and experiment
We choose the dissipation of sand f (the chance that
a grain of sand is deleted as it is shed from one node to
another) so that the largest cascades in simulations top-
ple almost all the network. (As a rule of thumb, take
f = 20/N , where N is the total number of nodes.) De-
creasing or increasing f extends or shortens the tail of the
avalanche size distribution, respectively. Thus we tune f
to utilize the entire system and to achieve a power law
over as many scales as possible, since we see power law
behavior in, e.g., blackouts in power grids [6].
In Fig. 3 of the main paper we compare simulations of
sandpile cascades with theoretical predictions for dissipa-
tion rate of sand f = 0.1. This somewhat large dissipa-
tion rate mitigates the largest cascades. In Fig. S3 S3.1
we show results for the same branching process predic-
tion (seven iterations of the self-consistency equations,
started from Sa = Sb = 1) with two independent sim-
ulations with dissipation rate of sand f = 0.05. Halv-
ing the dissipation rate noticeably extends the tails of
the marginalized avalanche size distributions—i.e., the
largest avalanches become larger. Iterating the self-
consistency equations an eighth time would more accu-
rately compute the probability mass in the tails, but is
beyond our computer resources. Showing the results of
two independent simulations (blue and green curves of
Fig. S3 S3.1) illustrates the variation in the cascade size
distributions. In particular, variation between simula-
tions is apparent only in the tails of the distributions, as
the largest avalanches are so rare. Even though the be-
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FIG. S7: Blue and green curves: independent simulations of
106 grains of sand dropped on power grids c and d, labeled
a and b respectively to match our theoretical notation. As
in Fig. 3, we collect statistics after 105 grains are dropped,
initialized with amounts of sand chosen uniformly at random
from zero to one less a node’s degree, with dissipation of sand
f = 0.05 (half the value used in Fig. 3). Red curve: branch-
ing process approximation using the empirical degree distri-
butions of c and d, obtained by symbolically iterating the
self-consistency equations (Eq. (3)) seven times, expanding
the result and collecting coefficients. The tails are decreased
in the simulations due to finite system size (439 in c, 504 in
d) and the dissipation of sand f , while the tails of the branch-
ing process approximation miss probability mass due of only
iterating seven times (which took a week on a 2GHz laptop).
havior of sandpile cascades on single networks is rather
robust to network structure [7–12], we see sensitivity to
the sparse connections among modules, as demonstrated
in the main paper. What is more, the particular de-
grees of nodes with external links profoundly affect the
inflicted avalanche size distributions,
∑
ta
sa(ta, tb) and∑
tb
sb(ta, tb). Notice the characteristic “blips” (devi-
ations from straight lines) that occur in the blue and
green curves (the simulations) in the inflicted avalanche
size distributions in the top-right and bottom-left plots
in Fig. S3 S3.1. For instance, there is a particularly high
probability that an avalanche begun in d topples 8, 9 or
10 nodes in c. We suspect this is due to the outlier node
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in network c that has one external link and ten inter-
nal links—far more internal links than all other c-nodes
with an external link. Consequently, a cascade in d that
leaks across to c via this node topples with high proba-
bility around 8, 9 or 10 nodes in c because of this node’s
high internal degree. Similarly, the blip at size 3 of the
distribution of inflicted cascade size from c to d results
from the average internal degree 2.5 of d-nodes with an
external link. It is surprising, given the indifference of
sandpile cascades to network structure, that the particu-
lar internal degrees of nodes with an external link greatly
affect the marginalized avalanche size distributions.
S3.2. Distance between the avalanche size
distributions and the product of their marginals
When we compare the branching process predictions
with simulations, such as in Figs. 3 and S3 S3.1, we re-
duce the dimensions of the joint sa(ta, tb) by marginal-
izing in order to plot one-dimensional curves. This
raises the question: how far are the products of the
marginals, such as (
∑
ta
sa(ta, tb))(
∑
tb
sa(ta, tb)), from
the joint distributions? Using the first 112 coefficients
of sa(ta, tb) (for 0 ≤ ta, tb ≤ 11) computed using La-
grange inversion (Theorem 1), we computed the distance
between sa(ta, tb) and the product of its marginals—in
the 2-norm, 1-norm and Kullback-Leibler divergence—as
a function of Bernoulli coupling p between two random
3-regular graphs. With increasing coupling p, the cas-
cade sizes ta, tb become increasingly correlated, and the
joint distribution sa grows increasingly distant from the
product of its marginals. This suggests that comparing
marginals, as in Figs. 3 and S3 S3.1, is an insufficient test
of the branching process, and thus we next subject the
branching process to its most stringent test.
S3.3. Fine-grained comparison of branching
process and simulation
Since marginalizing sa, sb, as in Figs. 3 and S3 S3.1,
may obscure deviation between theory and the branching
process, we next compare the joint distribution sa(ta, tb)
to simulation. In Fig. S3 S3.3 we plot Pr(Ta = 10, Tb = x)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 30 in the simulation (blue) and branch-
ing process prediction (red), for interconnectivity p =
0.005, 0.01, 0.1. We compute the branching process pre-
diction by calculating sa(ta, tb), sb(ta, tb) for ta = 10 and
0 ≤ tb ≤ 30 using Lagrange inversion (Theorem 1). Since
sand is dropped on nodes uniformly at random and each
network has 103 nodes, the avalanches begin in a or in
b with equal probability, so that Pr(Ta = 10, Tb = x) =
(sa(10, x) + sb(10, x))/2. Although the branching pro-
cess under-predicts theory for larger avalanches (espe-
cially with greater interconnectivity), we see qualitatively
good agreement.
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FIG. S8: Comparison of theory (red) and simulation (blue) of
the chance of toppling 10 nodes in a and 0 ≤ x ≤ 30 nodes in
b, in log-log scales. The simulations were Bernoulli-coupled
random 3-regular graphs with 103 nodes each, dissipation f =
0.02, and 2× 106 grains dropped.
S3.4. Capacity disparity
Cascades inflicted from large capacity networks to
small capacity networks are larger than those from small
to large capacity networks. Here we derive the heuris-
tic formula for this effect (Eq. (4)) using the multitype
branching process, and we show qualitative agreement
with simulation.
Differentiating the self-consistency equations (3) with
respect to τa and τb and setting τa = τb = 1 yields four
equations for the first moments of the avalanche size dis-
tributions sa, sb:
〈sa〉a = 〈ub〉b − 1
γ
, 〈sb〉b = 〈ua〉a − 1
γ
, (S12a)
〈sa〉b = −〈ua〉b
γ
, 〈sb〉a = −〈ub〉a
γ
, (S12b)
with common denominator
γ = −1 + 〈ua〉b 〈ub〉a − 〈ua〉a (〈ub〉b − 1) + 〈ub〉b . (S13)
For the first moments of the branch distributions ua, ub
for R(za)-B(p)-R(zb),
〈ua〉a = 1−
p
1 + za
, 〈ua〉b =
p
1 + zb
(S14)
(and vice versa for ub, interchanging a with b), the de-
nominator (S13) is zero, and Eqs. (S12) are all infinite.
This is not a surprise, because in isolation the networks’
cascade size distributions are asymptotically power laws
with exponent −3/2, which have infinite first moments.
However, one can compare the rates of divergence of the
mean inflicted cascade sizes, Eqs. (S12b), by computing
their ratio, 〈sa〉b/〈sb〉a = (1 + za)/(1 + zb). No other
ratios appear to contain useful information (nor depen-
dence on p with which to estimate the critical amount of
interconnectivity p∗):
〈sa〉a
〈sb〉a =
〈sa〉a
〈sb〉b =
1 + za
1 + zb
,
〈sa〉a
〈sa〉b = 1.
In all simulations on R(za)-B(p)-R(zb) with za 6= zb,
the heuristic formula Eq. (4) works qualitatively, in that
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inflicted cascades are always larger from the larger ca-
pacity network (i.e., za < zb =⇒ 〈sa〉b < 〈sb〉a).
But finding quantitative agreement with Eq. (4) is dif-
ficult because the avalanche size distributions are power
laws with such heavy tails that their variances diverge.
Figure S3 S3.4 is an example: for R(3)-B(0.005)-R(3),
〈sa〉b = 0.086± 0.019, and 〈sb〉a = 1.32± 0.023 (mean ±
standard error), which yields 〈sa〉b/〈sb〉a = 0.65± 0.019,
while theory predicts (1+za)/(1+zb) = 4/5 (20% error).
Nevertheless, Eq. (4) provides a simple, useful heuristic
for the dangers of small capacity networks connecting to
large capacity networks.
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FIG. S9: Qualitative agreement between the theoretical
prediction (Eq. (4)) and simulation on R(3)-B(0.005)-R(4)
(2 × 106 grains, 103 nodes/network, f = 0.02). Main plot:
marginalized avalanche size distributions of inflicted cascades
from a to b (blue), b to a (red). Inset: rank-size plot of the
largest 103 inflicted cascades from a to b (blue), b to a (red).
S3.5. Computational challenges in showing the
locally stabilizing effect
Although the locally stabilizing effect of interconnec-
tions is apparent in simulations, demonstrating it an-
alytically poses mathematical and computational chal-
lenges. Here we use multidimensional Lagrange inver-
sion (Theorem 1 in the Materials and Methods) to solve
for the probabilities of the smallest avalanches, sa(ta, tb)
for 0 ≤ ta, tb ≤ 10. Next we plot in Fig. S3 S3.5A the
marginalized avalanche size distribution
∑10
tb=0
sa(ta, tb).
Although it appears in Fig. S3 S3.5A that the largest
avalanches become less likely with increasing intercon-
nectivity p, in accordance with the results in simulations,
this figure has a caveat: we have only computed up to
avalanche size at most 10 in each network. As a result,
the right-hand tail of Fig. S3 S3.5A lacks probability mass
compared to the actual marginalized avalanche size dis-
tribution
∑∞
tb=0
sa(ta, tb), because, for example, there is
a significant chance of an avalanche of size ta = 10 and
tb = 11, 12 or 13. This figure could be improved by com-
puting sa(ta, tb) along “vertical strips” 0 ≤ tb ≤ tmaxb ,
where tmaxb  1, for just a handful of values ta. However,
computing the large coefficients of Sa requires differen-
tiating expressions raised to large powers, so the largest
coefficients are the most difficult to compute.
The Cauchy formula, Eq. (5) of the Materials and
Methods, uses integration rather than differentiation,
which can be more numerically stable [14]. But com-
puting the largest coefficients sa(ta, tb) with this method
requires integrating an increasingly large expression,
namely the result of iterating the self-consistency equa-
tions at least ta+tb+1 times, starting from Sa = Sb = 1.
This, too, takes a long amount of computation time:
computing sa(ta, tb) for 0 ≤ ta, tb ≤ 20 on a typical lap-
top computer would take on the order of a week.
A
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FIG. S10: Panel A: Increasing the interconnectivity p between
two random 3-regular graphs appears to mitigate the tails of
the local avalanche size distribution
∑
tb
sa(ta, tb). Plotted
are the first 11× 11 coefficients of Sa computed using multi-
dimensional Lagrange inversion [13] for p = 0, 0.5, 1. Panel
B: Increasing the interconnectivity p between two random
3-regular graphs “smears out” the avalanche size distribu-
tion sa(ta, tb), so that cascades large in both networks be-
come more likely. Plotted are sa(ta, tb) for 0 ≤ ta, tb ≤ 10,
computed using multidimensional Lagrange inversion [13] for
p = 0, 0.1, 1. We plot zero probabilities in white and positive
probabilities in a logarithmic color scale from orange (high
probability) to bright red (low probability).
Nonetheless, even the smallest 112 coefficients of sa
and sb are useful. Fig. S3 S3.5B, for example, shows the
joint avalanche size distribution sa(ta, tb) for two random
regular graphs with Bernoulli(p)-distributed coupling, for
p = 0, 0.1, 1. As the interconnectivity p increases, the
cascades begun in a increasingly “smear out” among a
and b, and cascades are more frequently large in both
networks at once.
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